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EDITORIAL

How Society Works

"IN ANY SOCIETY, individuals and social groups are bound to conflict over goals, priorities and their share of available resources. But they can still live tolerably well together if they accept certain minimal rules and principles which inescapably govern how their society functions." This is how Sir Charles Goodeve introduces a booklet entitled "How Society Works," recently published by OPUS, an Organization for Promoting the Understanding of Society (1975, London). The purpose of the booklet is to enunciate some general principles that apply to society—any society—so that its workings will thereby become better understood (the booklet is even subtitled "The need for wider understanding"). Eleven principles are proposed:

"1. Goods and services cannot be used or consumed unless they have been produced and made available.
2. Except in times of surplus, an increase in any one person's or group's consumption, if not matched by increased production, reduces the goods and services available for consumption by all other people in the same distribution area by the same total amount.
3. Of the total effort and resources available, a higher proportion can be devoted to investment only if a lower proportion is devoted to consumption.
4. Prices cannot be held below costs.
5. Man has the capacity to take in information, assess this in relation to his previous learning and choose a line of action in the light of his recognition of the related restraints and pressures. His choice usually indicates what he thinks will bring an outcome most advantageous to himself.
6. Membership of a group is both a means through which the individual achieves his objectives and also a constraint on his choices, in that he experiences pressures towards conformity to group standards and towards co-operation with his fellows.
7. Individuals, groups and organisations tend to cope with conflict by denying responsibility for their actions and passing on the responsibility to others.

8. All known systems of distribution of goods and services and of jobs are composed of two basic systems: (a) The market choice system; (b) the allocation system.
9. For any one country, total outward payments (such as for imports, capital investment and lending abroad) always balance inward payments (for exports and for borrowing and gifts).
10. Man feels a strong need to control those events which have most effect upon his own well-being and societies usually give him some degree of such power through ownership.
11. The more an individual has of material things or power the easier it is for him to gain the next increment of having."

Three types of principles

These principles are regarded by the authors as fundamental to the study of conflict and as independent of value judgement. They are proposed as laws based on logic and experience, being laws of nature, or simple statements of arithmetic, or man-made laws, although it is not always clear which of the principles fall into each of the three categories. Methodologically such identification may be of some importance since a law is, in fact, a model: it implies relationships between several entities which are mutually-exclusive in their definition, so that knowledge of given changes in some will lead us to certain expectations regarding the others. If such a law is a law of nature, then man can predict the expected values of particular variables and the outcome of any actions that he may take within the system governed by that law, he may even be able to determine ways in which he can bring about a desired outcome.

A man-made law, however, implies acquiescence by all members of society, or at least by all members of a given system, to play by the rules, man-made rules, designed to determine causal relationships and outcomes. Here man can affect the system in two ways, first by his actions (as in the case of laws of nature), and secondly by a changing attitude to the rules (involving attempts to reinterpret, modify or even abrogate them altogether). Thus, prediction of outcomes where man-made laws are concerned, involves an additional element of uncertainty regarding the "rules of the game" and the extent to which they are likely to continue to hold in any given situation. Indeed, the rules themselves may become a function of circumstances and subject to random effects, and this may partly be the reason for man's behaviour being sometimes regarded as totally unpredictable.

A law which is neither a law of nature nor man-made is often easily recognizable as a tautological statement. It is not a law in the sense that it reveals any new relationships between variables, it merely restates definitions proposed for these variables; its main purpose is reinforcement, a useful device in human communications, but the term "law" would be a misnomer, at best we could call it a "tautological law".

This distinction between natural laws, man-made laws and tautological laws underlines the suggestion that the first category is of a more lasting nature, the second is subject to change even in the short term and the third is a matter of semantics. To enunciate laws which are entirely free of judgement and independent of culture, religious creed or political persuasion, one would have to confine one's efforts to natural laws, and the authors of the OPUS document cannot be said to have done only that.

Validity and scope

And the resultant mixture has a symptomatic undulating level of rigour. Principle 2, for example, that when a static cake (total consumption) is divided among several groups, a greater share for one means a smaller share for another, is no more than a corollary of Principle 1 (worth re-stating nonetheless). Principle 5 either implies that man can ascertain his objectives in advance, and that he can (and does) systematically scrutinize alternative courses of action open to him and then behaves rationally in making a choice that will be most advantageous in terms of these objectives—a rather debatable premise—or that whatever outcome he manages to achieve is then defined as his stated objective —in which case we have an example of a tautological law.

Similarly, Principle 10 is somewhat obscure in that it does not properly define ownership: if what is meant is ownership of assets (such as the means of production), then hard evidence is distinctly lacking in support of the contention made; if the term also covers ownership of one's labour, then this is something that individuals have always had and the increasing power of organized labour stems not from change of ownership as from the ability to control union membership; but possibly there is some confusion here between power and responsibility and perhaps the intention of this Principle is first to convey the message that those who exercise power to influence events should develop a sense of responsibility and should be made accountable for the outcome of their actions, since the irresponsible use of power is a recipe for tyranny and exploitation, and secondly to suggest that ownership of assets (as, e.g. in cooperatives) and/or profits enhances responsibility. As for Principle 11 the authors go on to say that society now impedes the divergent flow of individuals to the opposite extremes of wealth and poverty through graded tax systems, death duty and provision of welfare, but they should have added the well-worn phrase "all things being equal". This Principle does not explain why the accepted tendency for the rich to become richer and for the poor to become poorer has not resulted in the total extinction of the middle class prior to, say, 1940 (since the impeding actions of society to which the authors allude have become paramount only during the last four decades or so), and this suggests that all things had indeed not been equal.

But it is not my intention to undertake a meticulous examination of each of the eleven principles and to dissect each at length as to its validity or the rigour

of its presentation. The mixture of disciplines of the unnamed authors may explain the differences in formulation of the principles in terms of style and emphasis, and rather than dwell on the chosen eleven one might wonder about many that could be added to this list, such as:

- man's behaviour is often dictated by his role and not only by his personality
- evaluation of performance can only be done against predetermined targets and yardsticks (or: unless you know where you are going, how will you know when you have arrived?)
- power corrupts; checks and balances are needed to control it
- processes in socio-economic systems are often irreversible, and when they are reversible there is a hysteresis effect (or: things are not what they used to be)
- there is always a conflict between the short term and the long term (this is perhaps a more general statement than Principle 3)
- most industrial situations are not zero-sum games and strategies of envy or maximization of self interest are not always best in terms of outcomes

Rational man

One could go on, and the authors of the OPUS document would undoubtedly be delighted to examine new propositions and add to their magnificent eleven. But it seems that a much more fundamental question needs to be asked: What is the precise purpose of these principles? If it is to enlarge our knowledge and understanding of society, then this is laudable enough. But the OPUS pamphlet is much more explicit in its objective, and apart from urging all responsible people in society to communicate these proposed principles to the populace at large, it ends up with the statement: "A better understanding will reduce conflict and release additional resources of energy to contribute to a more constructive and happier society."

This is a typical positivist–rationalist view, commonly held by students of the industrial scene; it is the school of thought that believes that problems facing society can be formulated and analysed in a systematic way, that when a number of courses of action are available it is desirable to examine them in terms of their relative merits and outcomes and that it is therefore possible to identify the best alternatives as judged by pre-defined criteria, that once an optimal solution to a given problem is determined it should be embraced and implemented—in short this school of thought believes in rational man.

What we need to ask ourselves is first, whether rational man is a realistic proposition, and secondly whether—assuming rational man is adopted as a working hypothesis—the result would be an elimination or at least a reduction of conflict. As for the first, it involves not only the assumption that rationality is universal and impersonal, that it is capable of a dispassionate determination in each case, that it is culture-free and that what is seen as rational by one individual will be readily (or after discussion) accepted as rational by another,

but also that once an individual recognizes what is a rational thing to do he will indeed do it. We know, alas, that neither accords with everyday experience. Arguments do persist about what solution logic should dictate, and no analysis of socio-economic and managerial problems is entirely value-free. Whether this state of affairs stems entirely from lack of agreement on goals (where it is not difficult to see that value judgement is bound to play an important part), or whether the choice of analytical tools also contributes to a potential discord, is a matter for debate; but the fact remains that we often encounter disparities in views, both concerning how problems should be defined and how they should be solved. And with regard to human behaviour, deviations from what appears to be rational choice are observed often enough, either because of inadequacy or ambiguity in goal definition, or for reasons of personality and other forces which may even be unconnected with the goals in question.

The second question alluded to earlier is whether rational behaviour is bound to reduce conflict. If we adopt a rationalistic viewpoint we have to accept that when a problem has a single optimal solution and if the interested parties come to realize and accept its logic, any conflict between them will automatically be dissipated. But it is similarly inevitable that when there is no single solution, that when one party can inflict incalculable damage on another in the pursuit of its own interests, it will indeed proceed to do so, and under those circumstances (which often occur in non-zero-sum games) rationality in the sense understood here will only exacerbate conflict rather than abate it.

Conflict theories

It is indeed curious how diverse are the prevailing views on the question of conflict and its resolution, as suggested by the following spectrum:

1. the one happy family theory
2. the paternalistic theory
3. the consensus theory
4. the conflict resolution theory
5. the continuing conflict theory

The first is held by those who are perturbed by the whole notion of conflict and who seek to avoid it either by denying that it exists or by trying to dismiss its implications. They argue that there is much more that unites employers and employees than divides them, that in the face of the overwhelming importance of their common goals sectional interests shrink into insignificance, and that the "working together" ethic is an essential element in the maxim that prevention is better than cure. And as long as prevention works, this theory is commendable enough, but it is impotent when conflict does arise because it does not explicitly address itself to the problem of distribution of profit and power in the industrial enterprise.

The paternalistic theory takes the view that an industrial conflict generally involves two very unequal contestants, so unequal that one can be completely

crushed by the other. The dominant contestant must, therefore, be aware of his power and show compassion by voluntarily allowing the weaker side to obtain greater benefits than those that he would have to be content with if judged solely by the power balance in the struggle. In years gone by it was the employers who had to exercise such a paternalistic role (albeit not always wisely); in modern times the power balance has shifted quite considerably, but those who hold to the paternalistic theory would argue that its message remains valid irrespective of which side is dominant in a particular struggle.

The consensus theory looks for a resolution of conflict in a way that is generally thought to be fair. It maintains that justice need not only be done but must also be seen to be done, that it is neither acceptable for the strong to impose their will on the weak nor is it sufficient for the strong to be magnanimous in a paternalistic fashion. Furthermore, a consensus of what is fair is not a matter to be confined to the parties involved in the conflict; since it is rare in modern industrial society for one sector to be totally immune from the repercussions of what happens in another, it is essential for outsiders to the conflict (outsiders with varying degrees of objectivity) to accept that justice has been done. It is not, of course, easy to determine in each case what the consensus is—the press and broadcasting media are both a help and a hindrance in this respect—but, as believers in the consensus theory will argue, this is a technical problem, which does not in itself invalidate the need for consensus; without it, resentment and enmity may ensue, sowing the seeds for fresh and even more bitter struggles in the future.

A consensus solution however, is not necessarily a rational solution; since a consensus inevitably involves taking the temperature of a political climate, particularly when major issues are involved, the recommended solution may well be influenced by strong emotions and transient considerations. Rational man will argue that no solution can have a lasting value unless the problem has been looked at dispassionately, that if reason is not satisfied, objections to the solution are bound to persist. It is far more profitable, therefore, to resort to logic and solve a given problem once and for all, in the same way that we solve mathematical problems under given premises. This conflict resolution theory has its attractions, but it suffers from two shortcomings: first, industrial problems (unlike mathematical problems), rarely have generally recognized premises and agreement needs to be reached about these premises before an analytical examination can be undertaken (and, alas, people's preferred premises may be affected by their expectations of the resultant solutions), and secondly for many non-zero-sum games there are no agreed analytical solutions, and questions of judgement and personal preferences regarding methods of co-operation between the players may thus remain.

Finally, the continuing conflict theory is not suggested as a substitute for the other theories, but as a supplement. It simply points out that a conflict is never finally resolved, that as soon as a solution is adopted for a given situation new

problems arise; and either the conflict re-emerges under a new guise or new conflicts are generated. It is therefore idle to pretend that any given conflict is an isolated static affair; it is but an element in an evolutionary process and hence it follows that whatever method is used to resolve a particular conflict, any bargaining that is employed, any consensus that is sought, should take account of the dynamic nature of conflict development and the changing forces that shape it.

Having said all this I must again concede that, while I continue to have reservations about the particular set of the OPUS principles, a case can obviously be made for attempts to improve our knowledge and understanding in this area. There is no guarantee that such knowledge will always be used to the good, indeed it would be surprising if it were not deliberately misused by the greedy and the unscrupulous, in the same way that all knowledge has been misused in one way or another during the history of mankind. There is no guarantee, therefore, that society will be any the better for knowing how it works, and there is certainly no quarantee that industrial conflict can thereby be reduced. And thus, in the application of whatever knowledge we manage to gain, it is well to beware of the pitfalls inherent in any of the theories of conflict resolution and to counsel caution. Attitudes of rationality, tolerance, moderation and compassion are not always compatible, yet they all need to be exercised in the management of industrial affairs; alas, not one of the theories can claim to encourage all these attitudes to such a degree that it could be totally embraced on its own to the exclusion of all others.

SAMUEL EILON
Chief Editor